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南臺科技大學 全球經營管理碩士班 李振宇所指導 陳廷晞的 非家族總裁繼任後，董事會權力和高階管理團隊重組如何影響家族先前不佳的企業績效：以台灣家族企業為例 （2020），提出small and medium-siz關鍵因素是什麼，來自於首席執行官繼任、家族企業、公司治理、策略管理、領導力挑戰。
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非家族總裁繼任後，董事會權力和高階管理團隊重組如何影響家族先前不佳的企業績效：以台灣家族企業為例
為了解決small and medium-siz 的問題，作者陳廷晞 這樣論述：
To explore a better corporate governance mechanism in Taiwan, the object of this study is to analyze how non-family CEO succession, TMT restructuring and board power will influence family businesses’ performance after the poor performance occurred in the family business. This Master’s Thesis’ main
assumption are as follows: When a poor performance occurs in family businesses, a family business is likely to appoint a non-family CEO; Hiring a new non-family CEO after a poor performance occurred in family businesses will have a positive effect on corporate performance in terms of financial perfo
rmance; The restructuring of top management team will influence the family businesses’ performance positively in terms of financial performance after CEO succession; Board power can moderate corporate performance after the non-family CEO succession. The higher level the family control is (more insid
e directors involved in the board), the higher degree the board intervene the management decision will be, and the lower the performance will increase.This study contributes to family business, strategic management, and corporate governance research by suggesting the following three results. First,
a family corporate is likely to appoint a non-family CEO when a poor performance occurs. This finding assures that as an outsider who has more managerial skills, capabilities, knowledge, and competencies can overcome the difficulties and influence the corporate’s development positively especially in
terms of financial performance. Second, board power can moderate corporate performance after the non-family CEO succession in family business. Though the finding is different from the prior research which indicate that the rise of the degree of “board independence” may influence corporate’s perform
ance positively. However, the third finding shows that the higher level the family control is (the more inside directors involved in the board), the higher degree the board intervene the management decision will be, and the lower the performance will increase. The result of the moderating effect on
non-family CEO and board power indicates that board power and board independence is crucial on moderating the succession in family business.